A childish act with geopolitical consequences

How Trump renaming the Gulf of Mexico could give China cover to claim the South China Sea and more.

Photo by Rikin Katyal on Unsplash

By Brian O’Neill

Americans opening Google Maps will see a new name for the Gulf of Mexico. Following Donald Trump’s executive order, the body of water is now labeled the “Gulf of America.” This trivial, nationalist rebranding seems designed more to stoke domestic applause than to serve any meaningful purpose. Given the array of global crises demanding attention—from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to tensions in the Pacific—it’s hard to imagine a less pressing concern for a U.S. president than renaming a body of water.

But this act, unserious as it might seem, should not be dismissed outright. Not because it fundamentally changes anything—Mexico is unlikely to redraw its own maps, nor will the United Nations amend maritime boundaries—but because of the precedent it sets. If Trump, or any U.S. leader, can unilaterally rename a major international feature and have it reflected in digital cartography, China will take note. And unlike Trump’s transparent attempt at nationalist theater, Beijing’s territorial renaming efforts carry far more serious implications.

China has long used maps as a tool of statecraft. From Tibet to the South China Sea, Beijing has systematically redefined geography to justify its territorial claims. In the South China Sea, it has renamed dozens of geographical features, reinforcing its claims over contested waters. In 2023, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued new names for eight Russian cities in the Far East, reasserting historical claims to territories ceded under 19th-century treaties. Last year, Beijing unilaterally renamed locations in Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian-administered region China refers to as Zangnan, claiming it has been Chinese territory “since ancient times."

For China, these are not arbitrary gestures. They are part of a deliberate strategy to reshape international narratives. The logic is simple: If maps reflect Beijing’s preferred terminology long enough, those terms begin to take hold. Over time, an artificial name change can morph into a broader claim of historical legitimacy.

Chinese maps label almost the entire South China Sea as theirs. School textbooks reinforce the notion that disputed territories are integral parts of China. When international companies use the “wrong” terminology—listing Taiwan as separate from China, for instance—Beijing pressures them into compliance.

Previously, the United States could argue that unilateral renaming of geographical features to serve territorial ambitions was a bad-faith tactic employed by revisionist states such as China; in fact Trump’s first administration explicitly rejected China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and championed a rules-based order. Now, with the renaming the Gulf of Mexico by fiat, the president has eroded that argument—though he has shown little regard for contradicting himself or ignoring diplomatic norms. If the United States can arbitrarily rename a major body of water to serve domestic nationalist narratives, how can it credibly challenge China’s renaming of Arunachal Pradesh or the South China Sea, let alone China’s use of these claims to justify further actions in Taiwan?

Perhaps none of this should be surprising. Trump’s relationship with maps has always been transactional—tools for self-importance rather than serious geopolitical instruments. One can easily imagine him sitting in the Oval Office, a Sharpie in hand, expanding Florida’s borders southward to include Panama and possibly Cuba—Guantánamo Bay, of course, would get extra bold underlining. It’s not far removed from his infamous “Sharpiegate” episode, when he altered a hurricane projection map to justify his false claim that Alabama was in the storm’s path.

The logic here is the same: Territory is whatever Trump decides it to be. If he can redraw a weather map, why not a maritime border? If he can rename the Gulf of Mexico, why not extend U.S. territorial waters all the way down to the Panama Canal? The problem is that international boundaries aren’t as forgiving as ink on a White House briefing map.

Unlike Trump’s renaming action, which carries, at least for now, little substantive weight beyond nationalistic signaling, China’s territorial assertions are backed by military force, economic pressure, and political coercion. The South China Sea is perhaps the most blatant example of this strategy. China has built and militarized at least seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, a region contested by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and others. Despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that rejected China’s sweeping maritime claims, Beijing has ignored the ruling and expanded its military footprint, deploying naval vessels and fortifying bases with runways, missile systems, and radar installations. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia regularly report Chinese military harassment of their vessels, with Chinese coast guard and militia ships ramming foreign fishing boats and blocking resupply missions. China now treats much of the South China Sea as de facto sovereign territory, despite protests from regional nations and the United States.

What appears to be a trivial renaming of the gulf might be viewed by Beijing as an acknowledgment of its own geographic revisions and actions to date. Whether its next steps are measured or overtly aggressive, Beijing will undoubtedly frame them as defensive measures rooted in historical entitlement.

Trump’s defenders might dismiss such concerns as overstatement, arguing that the Gulf of America decree is merely a superficial flex of executive power. But in geopolitics, precedent matters. This act—ostensibly symbolic—provides adversaries with a pretext to justify their own territorial maneuvers, reinforcing their claims under the guise of historical correction. Their interpretation will not lead to cautious recalibrations of their strategic aims; it will be seen as yet another opportunity to exploit.

For China, a nation that has made cartographic warfare a central pillar of its expansionist ambitions, this is an opportunity that will not be wasted. The Gulf of America might not just be a joke—it might be remembered as yet another justification for Beijing’s next move.

Brian O’Neill, a retired senior executive from the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center, is an instructor on strategic intelligence at Georgia Tech.

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