Tulsi Gabbard’s expected confirmation signals decline in Senate’s intelligence oversight

Senate’s intelligence overseers have replaced scrutiny with spectacle.

By Brian O’Neill

Senate confirmation hearings weren’t always guaranteed paths to a nominee’s approval, but they’ve long been political theater. Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court bid is certainly one etched in the minds of politicians and Hill observers—pundits and academics—as it affected the process. Bork’s defeat, driven by ideological opposition rather than a lack of qualifications, taught future nominees that the path to confirmation lay in strategic evasion rather than forthrightness.

Over time, hearings transitioned from examining policy expertise and qualifications to probing character, as seen in John Tower’s rejection as Defense secretary and last month’s confirmation of Pete Hegseth, highlighting how personal flaws can dominate the inquiries from committee members of the opposing party.

The certainty of clearing the confirmation bar now is measured on party alignment, not qualifications. When the president’s party controls the Senate, hearings predominantly prioritize political optics over genuine vetting.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence historically stood apart. Tasked with overseeing one of the government’s most sensitive and complex portfolios, it maintained a reputation for bipartisan cooperation and methodical scrutiny, reflecting the same tradecraft expected of intelligence officers. Mike Pompeo’s 2017 confirmation as CIA director reflected the committee’s ability to rally behind nominees with established qualifications, earning him broad bipartisan support. Dan Coats’ confirmation as director of national intelligence similarly demonstrated the Select Committee’s continued prioritization of competence and experience.

The 2020 confirmation of John Ratcliffe as DNI marked a shift. Despite initial bipartisan concerns over his limited intelligence experience and perceived partisanship—issues that had led to the withdrawal of his nomination the year prior—Ratcliffe was confirmed, underscoring a departure from the committee’s traditional emphasis on nonpartisan, qualifications-based evaluations.

The Biden administration didn’t so much restore SSCI’s traditional role of bipartisan, qualifications-driven scrutiny as it benefited from putting forward nominees whose credentials left little room for opposition. Avril Haines, the DNI nominee, and William Burns, the nominee for CIA director, were experienced, respected, and largely above reproach. SSCI members had little room to oppose them without appearing overtly petty. Both secured overwhelming bipartisan support.

Unsurprisingly, confirmation hearings for key nominees under the current administration mirrored the now-familiar pattern of partisan theatrics and superficial inquiry. Cabinet nominees faced rounds of scripted questions, and offered rehearsed responses designed to avoid political fallout. Republicans framed nominees as competent defenders of national interests, while Democrats zeroed in on character flaws, with queries on qualifications either largely absent or without depth. As David Brooks observed after the Hegseth hearing, substantive questioning meant to test a nominee’s preparedness has given way to superficial theatrics. If you expected otherwise, “you must be living under the illusion that we live in a serious country.”

DNI nominee Tulsi Gabbard’s Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing this month followed a familiar pattern. Given Gabbard’s lack of direct experience, one would expect the SSCI to focus solely on her qualifications. Instead, Democrats incessantly demanded she proclaim Edward Snowden a traitor, and Republicans downplayed past statements about Snowden, Ukraine, and Syria as isolated missteps rather than signs of deeper vulnerabilities.

Holding her accountable was appropriate. However, the more troubling failure lay with the committee’s unwillingness to publicly reveal her understanding of the complexities of intelligence coordination, strategic analysis, and the responsibilities inherent to the role.

The irony is unmistakable: A committee entrusted with ensuring that the intelligence community’s adherence to the highest standards of tradecraft—principles rooted in eliciting critical information under difficult circumstances—failed to apply them. Instead of crafting questions to penetrate her prepared defenses, they circled around high-profile talking points without pressing for clarity. Worse, when Gabbard offered vague responses, the questioning rarely adapted. There was little effort to follow up with probing inquiries that could have exposed gaps in her understanding or forced her to confront the limits of her expertise, her most significant vulnerability.

Rather than relying on recycled questions, the committee could have pursued inquiries directly tied to the DNI’s core responsibilities: maintaining analytical integrity, balancing competing priorities, and navigating the inevitable tensions between intelligence and politics. Such as:

• “Define objective and unbiased intelligence. How will you determine if bias exists?” This would have tested whether Gabbard understands that complete objectivity is an ideal, not a baseline, and whether she could outline safeguards to ensure it. Given that the word "objective" has become politically flexible, this line of questioning would have revealed whether Gabbard’s definition aligns with traditional intelligence standards or bends to partisan interpretations of truth.

• “During the Helsinki summit in 2018, President Trump appeared to trust President Putin’s denial of election interference over the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence community and the warnings of his own DNI. If the president publicly contradicts the intelligence you present, how would you respond?” This would have forced Gabbard to address how she would maintain the credibility of intelligence assessments when faced with public contradictions from the highest office. Her response could reveal whether she sees the DNI’s role as one of silent acquiescence or as a guardian of the truth.

• “Given President Trump’s confidence in your understanding of national security threats, beyond the obvious ones like China and cyber threats, which emerging or less-recognized threats would you advocate prioritizing?” A strong nominee wouldn’t rely on generic answers or deferrals but would demonstrate strategic foresight, highlighting areas such as biosecurity risks, space-based vulnerabilities, or the weaponization of AI and autonomous systems. The response would reflect not only awareness but also a proactive approach to identifying threats that could blindside policymakers if left unaddressed.

• “Given your concerns about the DNI being bloated and in need of reform, do you believe the DNI’s National Counterterrorism Center remains necessary?” This would have been an ideal question for Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), a key supporter of the center’s creation. This would have prompted Gabbard to demonstrate her understanding of cross-agency coordination and identify areas where genuine reforms are needed without compromising national security.

• “You have declared that the intelligence process has been prone to politicization. Where exactly do you believe the process has been compromised with the President’s Daily Brief?” The President’s Daily Brief is a rigorous, structured process involving coordination across the entire intelligence community. Dissenting views are documented in supplemental materials, and competing assessments are highlighted to avoid bias. Without specifying how the safeguards are failing, accusations of politicization remain hollow, raising questions about whether the problem lies in the process or how intelligence is interpreted and used by policymakers.

Perhaps the most ineffective approach during the hearing was the repetitive, yes-or-no demands over whether Edward Snowden was a traitor. Though her deflections were revealing, the committee could have forced clarity. A better approach would have been to ask: “Was Aldrich Ames a traitor? Did he deserve life in prison for the catastrophic damage he caused? Was Robert Hanssen, who sold out his country for personal gain, a traitor? If yes, why hesitate with Snowden?” Such a question would have made it harder for Gabbard to avoid confronting the gap between genuine whistleblowing and reckless, self-serving leaks.

The failure to ask questions like these reflected a fundamental breakdown in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s role as the remaining gatekeeper of qualifications and competence. What should have been a rigorous examination of Gabbard’s readiness instead followed a predictable script: Democrats focused on past controversies, and Republicans steered the discussion toward reassuring but superficial responses.

Last week, Gabbard secured the committee’s approval along party lines and is poised to win full Senate confirmation. Gabbard’s confirmation will be remembered not as a victory of merit but as a testament to how the Senate’s intelligence overseers have replaced scrutiny with spectacle. They have fully embraced the broader Senate’s fixation on publicity over integrity, prioritizing headlines over competence.

This is not just an unexpected inconvenience; it signals a dangerous trend. If this reflects the level of diligence SSCI intends to apply moving forward, the intelligence community itself might soon face hollowing from within. Members of this once-responsible committee, from both parties, now seem content with offering only performative outrage for the nightly talk shows while critical threats go unaddressed.

Without a shift in approach, the Senate Select Committee will contribute to the instability it was established to prevent.

Brian O’Neill, a retired senior executive from the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center, is an instructor on strategic intelligence at Georgia Tech.

---