Trump’s Yemen strikes: A playbook of escalation, distraction, and hubris
The Houthis have been fighting, and surviving, attacks for a long time. The right approach takes patience and precision.
By Brian O’Neill
This weekend, the United States launched a wave of airstrikes against Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, hitting radar sites, air-defense systems, and drone launch facilities—a campaign that is likely to continue. The strikes, ordered in response to continued Houthi attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, mark the most significant escalation since the group began targeting international shipping in late 2023.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has vowed an "unrelenting" missile campaign until Houthi attacks stop. Early reports suggest that the Houthis remain operational; the Trump administration claims some key Houthi figures were killed, with the Houthi health ministry posting that 53 people had been killed including "five children and two women.”
The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, have withstood years of internal conflict, Saudi air campaigns, and U.S. drone strikes, yet they have maintained control over much of northwestern Yemen since capturing the capital, Sana’a, in 2014. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition intervened to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Despite years of heavy airstrikes, ground battles, and economic blockades, the Houthis endured, using guerrilla tactics, alliances of convenience, and battlefield adaptability. This protracted conflict has killed more than 150,000 people and left millions in need of humanitarian aid.
President Donald Trump is framing this latest effort against the Houthis as a decisive response, posting on social media, that “YOUR TIME IS UP.” But history shows hyperbole does not produce results.
This doctrine of shock and awe has been used repeatedly, with the expectation that U.S. technological superiority and sheer firepower will force an enemy into submission. But airstrikes alone have rarely dismantled an entrenched force. The Houthis have absorbed years of bombardment and emerged more capable, refining their tactics and expanding their arsenal.
The immediate question is not whether the Houthis will be deterred (they won’t be) but how Trump will leverage these strikes for political gain. Most presidents do so: Reagan with Grenada, George H.W. Bush with the 1991 Gulf War, George W. Bush with his "Mission Accomplished" moment on Iraq, Obama with his "red line" warning to Syria’s Bashar al Assad, and Trump's targeted killing of Iran's General Qasem Soleimani.
But Trump’s second term is inextricably linked to optics—more so than in his first term—and his approach to military conflict is no exception. This campaign is not just about ending the Houthi threat; it is intended to make Trump appear strong.
If history is a guide, we are about to watch a familiar script play out:
Step 1: The Victory Lap—Trump Claims Instant Success
Within hours of the strikes, Trump took to social media to declare victory. The administration met expectations:
• "We're not going to have people sitting around with the missiles attacking the U.S. Navy.”
• “ . . . some of the key people involved in those missile launches are no longer with us.”
• Biden is to blame: “"These were not kind of pinprick, back and forth -- what ultimately proved to be feckless attacks," ”
The message emerging is that Trump’s military is different—that it operates without bureaucracy, without hesitation, without "weakness," as under his predecessors.
The news media will report developments, though right-wing media will mirror Trump’s declarative rhetoric. Fox News will air footage of explosions, with retired generals praising the clear message sent to Iran and other U.S. adversaries. Trump’s base will be told that America is winning again.
But Step 2 inevitably arrives.
Step 2: The Houthis Retaliate—Proving Airstrikes Didn’t Work
Any assumption that these strikes will deter the Houthis is flawed. The Houthis have endured years of far heavier bombardment. A few waves of U.S. airstrikes will not break them. Instead, their response will come swiftly and predictably:
• Continued or escalated attacks on shipping—The Houthis will likely continue targeting commercial vessels, demonstrating that their military capabilities remain intact.
• Propaganda blitz—The Houthis will probably flood social media with claims of civilian casualties, portraying themselves as victims of U.S. aggression.
The prospect of a Houthi strike on U.S. bases might be an overreach, but it shouldn’t be discounted. The most likely targets are in Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates, or even Saudi Arabia.
Regardless, Houthi strikes will push Trump to Step 3.
Step 3: Trump Doubles Down—"They Didn’t Get the Message"
As soon as reports of Houthi attacks—successful or not—are broadcast, Trump will likely escalate his rhetoric. His initial claim of overwhelming success would be replaced with indignation:
• “We gave them a warning, and they defied us—now they’ll pay the price.”
• “This isn’t Biden’s and Obama Bin Laden’s America—when we strike, we finish the job.”
• “We’re still fighting with Biden’s military, which is inept.”
Trump will probably authorize broader attacks. Though military commanders might advocate for a measured approach, Trump’s demand for a high-profile show of force would override strategic caution. Worse, he has surrounded himself with sycophants chosen for loyalty rather than expertise, making restraint and objective counsel unlikely before escalation deepens.
He likely will frame the expanded strikes as "teaching a lesson" to America’s enemies, but, in reality, this is where the United States would cross the threshold from strategic deterrence to outright military engagement.
Step 4: The Special Forces Option—Trump’s Search for a "Big Win"
When airstrikes fail to stop the Houthis, pressure will grow for more aggressive measures. Trump likely will authorize:
• Special forces raids on Houthi leadership targets.
• Expanded drone warfare across Yemen.
• Naval boarding operations against Iranian-linked ships.
If high-risk raids go sideways or fail to produce measurable results, particularly a rise in American public support, the political pressure to double down would be overwhelming. But unlike Somalia, where the United States withdrew in 1993 after the disastrous battle in Mogadishu that left 18 U.S. soldiers dead, the Trump administration’s rhetoric suggests it would instead push forward, unwilling to admit failure. Rather than treating setbacks as a reason to reassess strategy, Trump’s instinct would be to escalate—turning what began as a targeted operation into a broader regional conflict already teetering on the edge.
Step 5: The Economy Crumbles—So Trump Doubles Down
At this point, Trump would be locked in a cycle of military escalation. Meanwhile, the economy would continue to struggle.
Trump will probably use the war to:
• Deflect from economic failures—"Strong national security equals a strong economy."
• Push Congress for military funding—"We can’t afford to be weak right now."
• Blame Democrats—"The left wants us to surrender to terrorists."
Final Step: Declaring Victory, Even If It’s a Mess
This might seem like an obvious off-ramp—declare victory and withdraw, counting on the short memory of the American public—but such exits are rarely taken in the early stages of conflicts. Hubris and political considerations almost always prevail.
Previous administrations have followed this playbook, and Trump will be no exception.
But I could be wrong. Trump, as we have seen in recent weeks, is the quintessential waffler. He thrives on spectacle but rarely commits to a single course of action when a pivot offers more political advantage. One moment, he demands unrelenting strikes; the next, he could declare a “historic deal” and disengage, insisting he alone delivered peace. His strategy is less doctrine than instinct—a shifting, opportunistic calculation in which rhetoric outpaces reality. That unpredictability could provide an off-ramp, but it could just as easily accelerate the cycle of escalation.
The true uncertainty is not just how Trump will frame the outcome but whether he even has a clear endgame beyond dominating the news cycle.
Though attacks on shipping vessels have not been foremost in the minds of most Americans, the impulse for a forceful response is understandable. The administration’s re-designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in January was an appropriate step, reflecting their ongoing threats to global trade and regional stability. This classification enables expanded sanctions, criminal penalties for material support, and financial restrictions against the group.
But these tools must be applied with strategic realism. The administration should address the Houthis with the same counterterrorism approach used against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Occupying territory is unwise, and expecting total annihilation is fantasy. Instead, target leadership with surgical precision, leverage regional proxies to sustain pressure, and recognize that complete destruction is not the metric for success.
The American people understand that permanently eradicating an insurgent force is unrealistic—this isn’t acquiescence; it is reality. And reality—not bravado—is what produces effective, sustainable strategy.
Trump’s biggest obstacle in this crisis won’t be the Houthis or Iran—it will be his own impulse to mistake spectacle for strategy.
I hope that the administration proves me wrong.
Brian O’Neill, a retired senior executive from the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center, is an instructor on strategic intelligence at Georgia Tech.
Wow! Now THIS was a tutorial! Thank you, Mr O’Neill for setting this out so succinctly.
My guess: he’s trying to provoke Iran into a response which will justify a “war” which he needs —as legal justification for his crackdowns on immigrants and opponents.