By Brian O’Neill
To acknowledge what follows, you have to put aside quite a bit: The apparent unapologetic corruption behind President Donald Trump’s Middle East visit this week. His gushing praise for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—the same man who ordered the brutal murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. The sickening opulence of his reception in Riyadh and Doha, designed not to reflect American values but to feed one man’s hunger to be flattered like the autocrats he envies.
No other U.S. president would have demanded such pageantry. No other would have welcomed it so eagerly.
And, yet, something happened on this trip that deserves praise. Not because it reflects American leadership or strategic vision. It doesn’t. But a decision Trump made—however accidentally—could become critical to stabilizing a region and helping Syria finally close the decades-long, bloody chapter of the Assad family rule.
On Wednesday, Trump and Syria’s new interim president, former jihadist militia leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, met for 37 minutes, with Trump remarking after that he believes this “tough guy … has potential.” This is a typical Trump modifier-filled platitude to hide his shallow depth of interest in anything other than himself, but it was an important public acknowledgment nonetheless.
This was the first such encounter between U.S. and Syrian leaders in a quarter-century. The symbolism was undeniable, even if the substance remained uncertain.
Such a meeting was unthinkable months ago. Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed in December, but that collapse didn’t end the war. It created a vacuum. The central state collapsed. Armed factions scrambled for power. Into that chaos stepped al-Sharaa—then a powerful commander in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a former al-Qaeda affiliate. Al-Sharaa forged an interim government backed by a coalition of former rebel forces. In March, that government adopted a five-year roadmap toward new elections and national unification.
It’s not a Western-style democracy. It’s not even clear it will last. But it is the most serious attempt since Syria’s civil war began in 2011 to knit Syria back together.
To be clear: Political engagement and recognition of this interim government did not begin with Trump. In mid-December, before Assad’s fall was even fully consolidated, al-Sharaa met with U.N. Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. It was the first time a senior U.N. official had directly engaged with a figure from a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Days later, a high-level U.S. delegation from the Biden administration quietly followed, holding its own discussions with al-Sharaa. Soon after, the U.S. withdrew the $10 million reward it had placed on his head.
The European Union moved next. France and Germany reopened diplomatic channels in January. The United Kingdom began easing sanctions.
Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, moved faster—meeting with al-Sharaa’s government and pledging support.
By spring, a consensus was emerging: This isn’t the Syria anyone hoped for, but it might be the only Syria left to work with.
That consensus only gained traction in the days that followed. On May 12—just two days before Trump’s meeting with Syria’s interim president—the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish militant group that had fought the Turkish state for four decades, announced it would disband as part of a peace initiative with Ankara. For years, Turkey argued that the Kurdish fighters in Syria were an extension of this group. That claim is now harder to maintain. The Syrian Kurdish forces had already reached a ceasefire with the new Syrian government and agreed to merge into a national army. The collapse of Turkey’s central excuse for opposing them could remove one of the longest-running obstacles to building a stable postwar Syria.
Then came the United States. Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa wasn’t a policy rollout—it was a photo op that allowed Trump to announce the administration is exploring the possibility of normalizing relations with Syria. The day prior, Trump announced the removal of decades-long sanctions against the country.
According to reports, the decision was driven by pressure from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. But however it happened, it changed the picture.
This doesn’t mean the United States is now leading the Syria file. It isn’t. Washington arrived late, but its involvement still matters. A presidential meeting sends signals that even reluctant investors and institutions can’t ignore. The lifting of American sanctions carries global weight.
And let’s be honest about what sanctions achieved. They didn’t force Assad from power. They didn’t curb Russian or Iranian interference. And they didn’t stop Syria’s descent into economic ruin, warlordism, and mass migration.
Keeping the sanctions might have preserved moral clarity. But it offered no influence and no path forward.
Trump’s announcement came wrapped in his typical language. His remarks sounded more like a branding exercise than a diplomatic initiative. But that doesn’t mean the move was wrong. In fact, it might have been the right decision for reasons the president himself doesn’t fully grasp.
Still, none of this will be simple. Syria’s transitional government must now consolidate dozens of armed factions, rebuild institutions hollowed out by war, and reestablish control across a deeply fractured country. That won’t happen without external support—and it won’t hold without sustained pressure to ensure the process stays on track.
Israel, unconvinced by the new government’s promises, has continued military strikes in southern Syria. Iran, meanwhile, is watching for any opportunity to reassert influence. If this fragile transition falters, regional instability will return with it.
But the choice isn’t between perfect partners and permanent sanctions. It’s between shaping what emerges, or allowing others—Russia, Iran, or fragmented militias—to define Syria’s future for us.
And that’s why Trump’s decision to lift the sanctions matters.
This isn’t a redemption arc for Donald Trump. It’s a rare moment in which instinct aligned with opportunity. He made the right call. The question now is whether others—within his administration, in Congress, among our allies—will take the next steps.
Because the alternative—sitting on the sidelines while others dictate the terms—is far riskier.
Brian O’Neill, a retired senior executive from the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center, is an instructor on strategic intelligence at Georgia Tech.
Sorry, but trying to glean something good out of Trumps family dealmaking venture to the Middle East is wishful thinking. Whether we have active sanctions or not ( and I disagree with them being lifted) we are still on the sidelines with these countries. They will try to exploit us to get arms, which is something that we should not be doing period. Arming terrorist countries and corrupt dictatorships like Saudi Arabia is counterproductive and will always come back to haunt us when they are used to incur violence against another country. Legitimizing violent and repressive countries is not the way to go. Especially since Trumps administration will benefit personally from these deals. Trump did nothing good over there. He wants a shiny, gaudy, jet to use and that is why he went.
Any good that might accrue incidentally to Trump’s reputation is sullied considerably by the staggeringly remunerative real estate deals he has brokered in the region—billion$! I am glad the situation there may be somewhat defused, although many people have previously declared peace only to be disappointed again since the 1920s.