The path now for eliminating nukes from Iran
There are two routes that could work and a third approach that will almost certainly fail.
The problem with bombing Iran’s nuclear sites is and always has been that what is destroyed can be rebuilt.
Bombing will buy time, maybe a year or two, maybe more if it inflicts significant damage. No one yet knows. But the Iranian regime will almost certainly try to reconstitute its nuclear program. It has the knowledge to do so (as Ken Pollack of the Middle East Institute has said, “No one is ever going to be able to assassinate Iran back to nuclear ignorance”). And when the dust settles on this war, Iran might proceed with even more secrecy, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and denying the International Atomic Energy Agency the limited but still useful access it has had.
This does not by itself mean that President Donald Trump was wrong to attack now. Perhaps there was intelligence showing an imminent Iranian push to build a nuclear device (though we’ve seen no public evidence of that). It’s fair to believe that merely setting the program back was a worthwhile goal, or to be happy that Iran won’t be sending drones to Russia for a while, or helping its murderous proxies in the Middle East. But the argument that these strikes were about “finishing the job” Israel started or that “Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been obliterated” (as Pete Hegseth said yesterday) is preposterous.
There are only two possible lasting pathways to eliminating nukes from Iran, plus a third approach that will almost certainly fail. Let’s review them, in descending order of desirability and (unfortunately) difficulty.
Regime Change
If the Iranian people were to remove their brutal regime and replace it with one that did not want nuclear weapons, that would be the best outcome for everyone. The Iranian government maintains power by jailing, torturing, and (perhaps more than any country on Earth right now) executing its political opponents. It subjugates women and minorities. The militias it has armed have committed mass murder in Syria and Iraq. Millions of Iranians have risen up in recent years to demand a more democratic country at peace with its neighbors and the world. We should be on their side.
But the belief that bombing a country can encourage or enable people to overthrow their leaders is almost always wrong. Taking on the security apparatus of a regime like Iran’s is dangerous. And though the secret police have to hunker down when bombs are falling, so do ordinary people. For Iranians, this is a time for hiding in shelters and leaving big cities, not for demonstrating in public places or marching on government buildings.
Is regime change the Trump administration’s objective? Vice President JD Vance said yesterday morning that it isn’t. A few hours later, Trump chimed in that if the current regime “doesn’t make Iran great again, why wouldn’t there be a regime change?” Then again, the administration has shut down Voice of America (after calling its Persian language broadcast employees back to work last week, it told them they were fired again) and tried to defund Radio Free Europe’s Iranian broadcasting service (which remains on air only because federal courts have stopped the administration from impounding its funds). Access to uncensored news is pretty important to anyone organizing opposition to a dictatorship.
For its part, the Netanyahu government in Israel seems to have an almost messianic belief right now that it can transform the Middle East by force. It was encouraged when its strikes in Syria and on Hezbollah facilitated the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria. But in Syria, a capable armed opposition movement controlled territory and could march on the country’s capital when Israel weakened its defenders. There is no equivalent in Iran to Syria’s Hizb-ut-Tahrir militia—only a persecuted but unarmed populace and a regime much more powerful and embedded in its society than Bashar al-Assad’s was in Syria. As Israel’s strikes claim civilian lives, Iran’s people and regime might even for a time be brought closer together, not driven further apart.
In short, there’s nothing wrong with wishing for regime change in Iran. We should be helping the Iranian people by supporting democracy activists, increasing international broadcasting, and keeping our doors open to refugees (all the opposite of what Trump is doing). But we should not get sucked into a war with regime change as its goal—and Israel’s campaign, which is targeting far more than Iran’s nuclear sites, seems to be veering in that direction.
External Supervision
Bunker-buster bombs might or might not penetrate Iran’s heavily fortified underground uranium enrichments facilities. But under the Obama-era agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), nuclear inspectors could walk in to those and to all known nuclear sites in Iran, plus leave cameras behind that kept them under 24/7 surveillance. Inspections done right can be much more effective than explosions in keeping Iran’s nuclear program in permanent stasis. And though it’s true that Iran lies and cheats, combining Israeli and American intelligence with on-the-ground inspectors who can go wherever they need would allow us to know in real time what Iran is doing and to respond with sanctions and force to any violations. If an agreement could be reached allowing that kind of intrusive monitoring for the next decade or so, it would buy more time for the Iranian regime to weaken and for a more permanent solution to emerge.
The JCPOA was imperfect (in part because its toughest provisions expired over time), but when it was in force, Iran was a year from producing enough highly enriched uranium to build an atomic bomb. The work Iran did after Trump withdrew from the agreement reduced that “breakout” time to within days.
It looked for a second as if Trump wanted to go back to a similar, if cosmetically tougher, negotiated freeze on Iran’s program, with an effective inspection regime and enrichment of uranium conducted outside Iran. It also seemed that progress was possible.
Israel’s strikes (which Trump reportedly tried to discourage) derailed that diplomacy. Israel might have intended that. Perhaps Trump then decided that if he couldn’t dissuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he might as well join him and make the best of it. It would not be the first time he bent to a more strong-willed leader. His first instincts, in this case, were the better ones.
Mowing the Grass
The immediate question is whether Iran’s regime will retaliate against the United States. It’s possible that it will hit back hard enough that Trump feels compelled to escalate U.S. involvement, which could have dangerous consequences. It’s also very possible that it will not be able to muster a serious response, given the damage to and depletion of its military forces, the weakening of its proxies, and its fear of losing power. If so, in the near term, most Americans will view Trump’s decision to strike as a success.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu will likely carry on for a while longer. If there is no regime change and no diplomatic breakthrough (which he’ll continue to discourage), he’ll rely on his usual strategy of destroying as much as he can, then waiting for Iran to rebuild (i.e. letting the grass grow) and then hitting again in a year or two. Let Iranians live in dictatorship and misery at home and regular bombing from abroad and assume that security in the Middle East can only be achieved by the constant application of coercion and violence.
This was his approach to Gaza over many years. It worked until it failed spectacularly. Trying it against a country with 90 million people and vastly greater resources might also work for a time. But the failure, when it comes, would be even more painful.
A diplomatic agreement is less likely now but not impossible. It will take more focus, patience, and determination than Trump probably has. But I’d give him credit if he succeeded.
A Note on Legality
Over the past 48 hours, a central Democratic critique of Trump’s attack on Iran has been that it was illegal or unconstitutional because he did not have prior approval from Congress. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) even said he should be impeached for this.
I get the frustration my former congressional colleagues feel, especially because the administration apparently didn’t conduct the most basic consultations with them. But I’d be careful about this line of attack.
Almost every recent president—including Barack Obama in Libya and Bill Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo—has launched air strikes abroad without formal authorization from Congress (in fact, presidents have routinely conducted limited foreign military operations without authorization since the 19th century). No modern president would have sought prior approval for a one-day strike on a target like Iran’s nuclear sites. The one exception was Obama asking Congress to approve strikes on Syria after its use of chemical weapons in 2013. We learned from that episode that many members of Congress who complain when presidents act alone actually don’t want the responsibility that comes with having to share in such decisions.
So, this is actually a rare example of Trump acting consistently with recent norms, whether one thinks those norms are good or not. And most Americans won’t mind as long as the operation is perceived as successful.
I also think it’s a mistake for Democrats to force votes in the House and Senate to prohibit the use of force in Iran. No Republican (apart from a couple of hard-core libertarians) will vote for a bill that says “Trump can’t do something,” and a few Democrats might join them. Such a resolution would be defeated, and Trump would emerge with greater authority to strike.
A better approach would be to embrace the process outlined in the War Powers Act of 1973. This law allows the president to commit U.S. forces to conflict without congressional approval for 60 days. If Congress does not pass resolutions authorizing the use of military force (or AUMF) in that period, the president must stand down.
What Democrats should do is to say: “Trump’s actions trigger the 60-day clock under the War Powers Act.” They should challenge Republican leaders to move the resolution needed to extend his authority to act beyond those 60 days and introduce such a resolution themselves if Republicans don’t act. My guess is that an affirmative vote to give Trump a long-term authorization would give anti-forever-war Republicans greater pause than tying Trump’s hands in the middle of the crisis. And Democrats wouldn’t have to win an AUMF vote; they would just need Congress to fail to act (otherwise known as Congress’s greatest talent). In that case, Trump’s authority and legitimacy to wage a long war would vanish.
Tom Malinowski is a former member of Congress from New Jersey who was assistant secretary of state in the Obama administration.
 | A guest post by
|