Is the Gaza Ceasefire about to Collapse?

What to expect in the days ahead

This upcoming weekend marks a pivotal moment in Gaza ceasefire negotiations. Phase 1 of the agreement between Israel and Hamas—negotiated by Qatar, Egypt, and the Biden Administration, with strong cooperation from Trump’s team days before his inauguration—is ending. If the parties can agree on a next phase it could lead to an end to the war. The much more likely scenarios, however, are either a resumption of the conflict or a temporary extension of the ceasefire.

The current ceasefire and hostage deal involved Hamas releasing 33 Israeli hostages (8 dead) over 42 days in exchange for Israel ceasing operations in Gaza, pulling out of some areas, releasing thousands of Palestinian prisoners, and allowing more humanitarian aid to flow. The agreement stipulated that during this first phase, Israel and Hamas would begin negotiations on Phase 2, in which they would agree on the release of the remaining 62 hostages (about half of whom are presumed dead), Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza, an end to the war, and most challenging of all, how Gaza would be governed after the war.

Implementation of Phase 1 has been unsurprisingly bumpy, including multiple moments where the deal could have collapsed but has fortunately held. The latest disagreement is over the grotesque hostage release ceremonies Hamas is conducting in Gaza—especially the circumstances and public displays surrounding the release of the murdered Bibas children and their mother. Israel responded to this public display by suspending the latest Palestinian prisoner release, but the parties have worked out a way ahead and the ceasefire is holding for the moment.

The much bigger problem is that there has been no progress on Phase 2 negotiations. Discussions about the future governance of Gaza have been on the table for a year with all parties at an impasse. They are unlikely to be solved by this weekend. The far-right members of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s governing coalition will not support any plan that does not entail settlement of Gaza and expulsion of Palestinians. Hamas will never agree to that, though it might agree to governance by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which already controls the West Bank, or to some transitional entity of technocrats supported by the Arab States, the PA, and the rest of the international community. Netanyahu could pursue serious Phase 2 negotiations with the support of Israeli centrists such as Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid, who are currently in the opposition, but this would likely result in the eventual collapse of his government. So instead, Netanyahu has apparently chosen to avoid the issue, as he has for the past year, prioritizing his own political survival over getting the hostages out and ending the war.

The Trump Administration worked closely with the outgoing Biden team to help seal the ceasefire in January, in a rare show of bipartisan cooperation. However, it has frittered away the past six weeks. Trump’s declaration of an entirely unrealistic and deeply immoral plan to remove all Palestinians from Gaza and redevelop it under U.S. auspices has been a massive distraction. Just this week he posted a bizarre AI-generated video on Truth Social laying out his vision for Gaza. The video, which envisions a future Gaza with a golden idol statue of Trump and images of Netanyahu and Trump sitting together shirtless on the beach, received backlash even from his own supporters. Worse, Trump’s plan has created unrealistic expectations with the Israeli public that the removal of all Palestinians from Gaza might be possible, further limiting any political maneuvering room Netanyahu had to cut a realistic deal.

In the city of Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, November 18, 2024.

Trump has also recklessly and publicly signaled that Netanyahu has a green light to go back to war—despite that the overwhelming majority of the Israeli public supports prioritizing the hostages and ending the war, while the hostage families themselves campaign for sustaining the ceasefire.

The Administration has been hampered by having basically no staff. Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who played an important role in the initial ceasefire agreement working with Biden’s lead negotiator, Brett McGurk, delayed his visit to the region this week because he was working on Russia-Ukraine negotiations. Given the impending deadline and the possibility for things to explode in Gaza soon, one wonders what the Secretary of State is doing if the Mideast envoy is negotiating the end of a different war? It’s also an indicator that the Trump Administration’s lack of respect for process or the value of career officials is starting to catch up with them. The Trump team was able to swoop in and help the Biden team seal a complicated deal without any staff because the Biden administration had done months of detailed work. But it’s much harder to negotiate a new and complex second phase without proper staffing, all while putting the Middle East envoy in the role of negotiating on Ukraine.

Where do we go from here? There are three scenarios. The first is that that the parties come to an agreement on Phase 2 by Sunday or in the days after. That is extraordinarily unlikely. Though it bears mentioning that an Arab League Emergency Summit on Gaza scheduled for March 4 could result in a new counter proposal to Trump’s Gaza plan and possibly open up some space for negotiations.

The second possibility is that Israel and Hamas agree on an extension of Phase 1 by which Israeli hostages continue to be released in exchange for more aid, prisoners, and the continued ceasefire. This would suit Netanyahu, who wants to get the hostages but not accede to Hamas’ desire to end the war. The Israelis have indicated they are willing to extend negotiations by a week and will not restart the war at the end of this weekend as long as there is progress on an extension. The question is whether Hamas will agree. They don’t want the conflict to restart, but if they give away all the hostages, they lose their leverage over Israel—which can then restart the war at any time.

The third possibility is a restart of the war. This would mean the death of more innocent Palestinians and the likelihood that more Israeli hostages lose their lives. And since Israel still has no strategy for how this could effectuate the removal of Hamas from Gaza, it accomplishes little outside of sustaining Netanyahu’s hold on power.

The biggest wildcard right now may be Trump. If he decides that he wants to be seen as the peacemaker, which is how he approached the issue during the campaign and transition, then given his tremendous popularity in Israel—especially with Netanyahu’s base—he has the leverage with Netanyahu to box him in and perhaps get a deal over time to end the war. But if he decides to give the Israelis the green light, to which he has appeared inclined in recent days, the fighting may start again.

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Ilan Goldenberg served as Vice President Kamala Harris’s Special Advisor on the Middle East and previously held positions at the Pentagon and State Department. He is the author of the Dialogue and Dissonance Substack.