A Gaza Ceasefire and Hostage Deal

This is not the first column I expected to write for The Contrarian. I presumed it would be my personal story and how I’ve wrestled with issues associated with Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Middle East. Instead, I am thrilled that after fifteen months of agony in Israel and in Gaza, my first piece is about an agreement on a ceasefire and a hostage deal.

The agreement will be broken into three phases. In the first phase, which will last six weeks, Hamas will release 33 women, children, adults over the age of fifty, and those severely wounded or sick (both alive and dead). In exchange, Israel will release a large number of Palestinian prisoners—many who committed minor crimes, others who have been serving long sentences for violent acts.

During this phase, Israel will also pull out of main population centers in Gaza and allow Gazans to begin returning to the northern part of the Strip, which they have not been able to access since being displaced at the start of the war. Israel will also evacuate the Netzarim corridor, from where it launched much of its military operations, and agree to a major surge of humanitarian assistance.

In Phase II, Hamas will release all remaining living hostages – primarily men of military age – in exchange for a complete territorial withdrawal from Gaza. There will need to be an agreement on post-conflict governance in Gaza that is not Hamas. And in Phase III, all the bodies of the remaining hostages will be released in exchange for a major reconstruction plan.

Implementation will likely be very dicey, given the deep lack of trust between the parties and the logistical challenges of their commitments. Will Hamas be able to successfully track and release all of the hostages it has promised, given that some are being held by other groups in Gaza? Similarly, can Israel deliver on the surge of humanitarian aid it has promised? And even if it does, will the aid reach Palestinians in need, given that the devastated infrastructure in Gaza makes it hard to transport assistance? With a breakdown of the security inside the territory, much of the aid might get hijacked.

Why did it take so long? It starts with Hamas, which triggered this with the October 7^th terrorist attacks, then took primarily hardline positions in the negotiations—especially when they believed that tensions in the region would ignite a regional war that would put Israel in a weakened position and get Hamas a better deal. The opposite happened: Israel dealt Hezbollah a significant blow, effectively defended itself from Iranian attack, and took out Iranian air defenses. Faced with a weakened hand, Hamas finally took a deal.

However, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his far-right allies—especially Itamar Ben Gvir—also bear a lot of the responsibility in extending the agony in Gaza and the misery of the hostage families. Netanyahu would not agree to a deal that Ben Gvir opposed while Ben Gvir had the ability to bring down the Israeli government. That changed in the fall when a small Israeli political party joined Netanyahu’s coalition and gave him the votes he needed to keep his government intact in the aftermath of a hostage deal. But remember: Netanyahu could have overwhelmingly passed a hostage deal at any time with support from the opposition, even if it would mean the collapse of his government.

As for who takes credit for this agreement—you’ll hear a lot of crowing from the right that this was somehow Trump who negotiated the deal. He does deserve some credit for applying public pressure and signaling his desire to end the war. The fact that both Trump’s representative and Biden’s were in Doha together was an exceptionally rare example of bipartisan cooperation on a seemingly impossible issue. But the Biden administration has worked tirelessly for the past fifteen months to bring about this deal.

Sadly, the agreement came about after way too much suffering and destruction. There are many things that this Administration, in which I served, could have done differently. But that is a story for a different column—or many columns. For today, it is worth celebrating this moment. Let everyone on the American political spectrum take some credit, if they must.

The mediators—including the U.S., Qatar, and Egypt—have a vital role in pressing the parties to live up to their commitments. This will be especially hard given the simultaneous US transition of the presidency. Trump’s negotiators, who have worked surprisingly well with Biden’s, would be smart to keep some of the latter around to help ensure that intensely detailed commitments are kept.

As for building something better in Gaza, my guess is that the parties will ultimately find a way to implement the second and third phase to end the war permanently, because neither side wants to keep fighting.

But don’t expect them to agree on a post-conflict governance arrangement for Gaza that Secretary Blinken laid out yesterday. For any of that to work and for international actors to buy in and support it with boots on the ground and resources, this plan would have to be seen as a major step towards the eventual reunification of Gaza and the West Bank and the beginning of a two-state solution. Netanyahu and his far-right allies would never go for that.

The most realistic scenario is that Hamas and Israel paper over their differences on post-conflict governance to end the war and get all the hostages out. The result leaves in place a weak Hamas in charge of Gaza, untold numbers of Palestinians living in horrific conditions, and no promising path forward for either side.